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2Abstract
Japan’s financial system, and especially its banking system, today are in
substantial trouble, epitomized by the bad loan problems.  This paper provides an
overview of the major causes of the current banking mess.  Fundamental forces
include the transformation of the Japanese economy in the mid-1970s from one of
excess investment demand to excess savings surplus, and with successful growth
the development of a number of strong, increasingly companies.  The paper briefly
discusses four major causes that were particularly important: failure to create a
prudential regulatory system as deregulation proceeded; the creation and then
bursting of the stock and real estate market bubbles; globalization; and the high
rate of financial innovation.  A series of five major macroeconomic policy mistakes
are identified as retarding the recovery of the economy, and indeed the late 1996
policy errors led to the 1987-98 recession.  Japan’s 1990s poor economic
performance has made the banking problems more severe and costly, as hopes
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Introduction
A mere decade ago Japan’s financial system, and especially its banking system, was
not only the largest but the strongest in the world. Nine of the world’s top ten
banks in asset size were Japanese; the Big Four Japanese securities companies
were the world’s largest; and its life and casualty insurance companies were
likewise huge. Banks had ample, low cost, deposit funds and the highest credit
ratings. The largest were expanding their international operations vigorously, and
did 34 percent of the world’s international lending business, more than banks
domiciled in any other country.
Today presents a completely different picture. Japan’s financial system is
weak and in disarray. Banks no longer rank among the world’s top ten, and their
credit ratings have declined dramatically. Two of Japan’s top 21 banks have
already collapsed, as has one of the Big Four securities companies, and a mid-sized
life insurance company. This is not only unprecedented in Japan’s postwar history,
until the l990’s it was unthinkable.
This paper focuses primarily upon the problems of the Japanese banking,
though the analysis applies in many respects to the securities and insurance
industries as well. It does not consider Japan’s fiscal mess: its budget deficits, tax
system, government fiscal and loan programs, or the special account debts that
cannot be serviced. This is a comprehensive overview rather than a detailed
4analysis of specific issues or topics. It provides the groundwork for this conference
by addressing two themes: the ‘postwar’ financial system and its implications; and
causes of the current banking difficulties.
The objectives of any financial system in a market based economy are
threefold: the safety of the system in order to prevent bank runs and monetary
panics; its effectiveness in mobilizing savings and allocating them to productive,
efficient uses, by financial intermediation through banks or capital (stock and
bond) markets; and efficiency in the provision of financial services, best achieved in
a highly competitive system. These objectives can be in conflict, depending on how
the system is organized and what constitute the rules of the game. The
achievement of these objectives depends on the overall economic environment,
including the level of economic development, the degree of competition, and the
extent of global financial market integration.
In designing the postwar financial system, the regulatory authorities,
essentially the Ministry of Finance, always placed great emphasis on system safety,
and maintained or built upon the wartime bank-based financial system.
The ‘Postwar’ Financial System
The basic characteristics of the financial system in the era of rapid growth until the
mid-1970’s are well known.1 It was essentially a bank-based system, with
deliberately underdeveloped stock and bond markets. Risk-averse savers had few
alternatives to holding savings deposits; and rapidly growing corporations had to
rely heavily on bank loans to finance their extraordinarily high rates of fixed
investment. The structure of banks was stable and cl ss s of bank were segmented
by function and size of customer. Deposit-taking institutions included city banks,
long-term credit banks, and trust banks, which together comprised the Big Banks,
lending mainly to large corporations; and local or regional banks, mutual savings
banks, and credit associations and cooperatives, lending mainly to medium and
small businesses and individuals.2 The system was also stable in that there was no
new entry, and virtually no failures or other exits; the few failures were of small,
5badly managed, inconsequential institutions which were readily and rapidly
absorbed by larger banks.
In effect, the essence of the regulatory regime was to guarantee that banks
would not fail, so their management, stockholders and depositors were protected.
This was achieved by interest rate controls, with wide spreads between deposit and
loan rates, so that all financial institutions made profits. Moreover, a ‘convoy’
system was maintained whereby the assets of all banks grew at about the same
rate, and their relative ranking did not change over time. In this system interest rate
competition was not allowed and other forms of competition were muted.
Moreover, it was the responsibility of the strong to take care of the weak. Should
a troubled small financial institution have to be merged into a larger one, any losses
were more than offset by the franchise value of the branches thus acquired.
The system was based on close, symbiotic relationships between the
powerful Ministry of Finance and the big banks, securities companies, and
insurance companies. These collusive arrangements were based on the leadership
of the Ministry of Finance through administrative guidance, price setting,
protection, and restriction of competitive impulses. Accordingly, it was a system of
implicit guarantees against losses for banks and depositors.
The development of the main bank system in many respects epitomized the
stereotype of large bank-big business relationships, though in practice given the
industrial structure, most of the banking system’ s credit was lent to medium-sized
and smaller businesses. The main bank system overcame severe problems of
inadequate information and difficulties in analyzing the many new projects
embodied in the process of rapid postwar economic development.3 Th  main bank
monitored its main industrial clients, established and maintained efacto lending
syndicates to them, and had a special responsibility to step in and provide financial
and managerial assistance in times of trouble. While all Big Banks had some main
bank clients, the major main banks were Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Mitsui, Fuji,
Sanwa and Dai-ichi-Kangyo, notably with relationships with their respective
6keiretsu members, and the Industrial Bank of Japan, with a wide range of main
bank relationships.
This postwar system was very safe and it carried out its financial
intermediation role well, but it was not very efficient. Savers bore most of the
costs because of low interest rates on their deposits and lack of alternative financial
instruments. They correctly perceived, however, that their savings were fueling the
process of rapid growth, and their reward was in wage increases, not interest
yields on savings.
The postwar system could not last forever. As companies and banks thrived
and grew much larger, they became stronger and more independent and many
chafed under the restrictions of the system. The most important cause of the
demise of the system however, occurred in the mid-1970’s, when Japanese growth
slowed and Japan shifted from being an economy in which private investment
demand outstripped private saving to one in which ex ante private saving became
greater than ex ante private investment.
This shift is fundamental in understanding the performance and
macroeconomic policies of the last 20 plus years. Japan has been and is a demand –
deficient economy, in which private saving continues to be larger than private
investment demand. This change has dramatically affected the financial system and
especially the banking system, and fundamentally undermined the highly regulated
and controlled stable postwar financial system. The supply of funds suddenly
become ample, interest rates declined, and pressures for a system of market-based
interest rates became irresistible.
Accordingly, the Ministry of Finance came under increasing pressure to
deregulate the financial system: to allow market-determined interest-rates, the
creation of new financial instruments, development of a vigorous, competitive
bond market, the breaking down of market segregation, and in general increased
competition for all financial institutions and in all financial markets. However, the
deregulation process has been steady but very gradual, beginning in the late 1970’s
7and still continuing. A great deal of progress had been made by the early l990’s,
and currently the ‘Big Bang’ of comprehensive financial reform, announced in late
1996 and due to result in completely ‘free, fair, and open’ financial markets by
March 2001, is supposed to bring about the final stage of deregulation. While there
are likely to remain a few unresolved issues, notably the postal savings system, for
the most part this final deregulation process is proceeding on schedule.
In other words, Japan has been moving to a competitive, market-based
system of banking and capital markets. Financial institutions are now under great
pressure to cut costs, increase efficiency, and develop new financial products in
order to compete. The new environment creates new kinds of risks, with new
opportunities and dangers to taking risk, including interest rate risk for assets and
liabilities, exchange rate risk, and credit risk since companies are also in a more
competitive environment.
The ways in which the Ministry of Finance has handled, or mishandled, this
long-run deregulation process and the concomitants changes in financial markets
laid the groundwork for the current banking and financial mess.
Basic Causes of Current Banking Difficulties
Japan’s current banking difficulties, which indeed have persisted since the early
1990’s, developed over a considerable period of time, with a number of forces at
work. Four causes were particularly important. They were failure to create a
prudential regulatory system, the creation and then bursting of the stock and real
estate market bubbles, globalization, and the high rate of financial innovation.
Before considering the causes, however, it is important to define the nature
and extent of the problem. While Japanese banks have a number of problems, the
fundamental problem is that the banking system has a huge amount of actual and
potential non-performing (ie. bad) loans relative to its capitalization and bad loan
reserves. Moreover, this problem has festered and worsened throughout the 1990s.
The harsh reality is that every Big Bank and indeed most other deposit-taking
8institutions have had serious bad loan difficulties. These range from loans to
companies that have gone bankrupt; non-performing loans in which interest and
principal payments are unpaid and substantially past due; loans which have been
restructured at highly preferential, extraordinarily low interest rates; and loans
which are currently being serviced but future payments are in doubt. Banks lending
in urban areas, particularly Tokyo and Osaka, have been the most hard hit. In
contrast regional banks in rural areas to which the real estate speculative mania did
not spread have had minor losses, and are now the strongest banks in Japan.
Over time the disclosed amounts of bad loans have increased until recently,
even after write-offs. Private estimates of actual bad loans have been substantially
greater than the amounts announced by the banks and the Ministry of Finance.4 In
fall 1997 the Ministry of Finance shocked the world with its estimate of the bad
and troubled loan problem – some ¥76.7 trillion, triple previous estimates, and 12
percent of total bank loans and credits, 12 percent of loans of Big Banks, ten
percent of regional banks, and 14 percent of second-tier banks. However, this
reflected the new inclusion in the definition of bad loans a category of loans
currently being serviced but in potential future danger. A Bank of Japan study
estimated that over a three year period about 84 percent of such loans continued to
be serviced, but of course future estimates depend upon corporate borrower
performance, in turn dependent upon the overall performance of the economy.
In practice, the actual amount of bank bad loans has been ambiguous, for a
combination of definitional, measurement, and disclosure reasons. Most data are
on a parent bank basis, but when their various real estate financing and other non-
bank financed institutions are included on a consolidated basis, the estimates are
often far different. Only in 1997 did regional banks and credit associations first
disclose their bad loans. Over time the definition of bad loans has become more
comprehensive and clear, now approaching the U. S. SEC definition. However,
each bank estimates its own bad loan situation. The presumption is that the
estimates of stronger banks are closer to reality than those of weaker banks. When
weak banks have in fact collapsed, subsequent audits have revealed that the actual
9bad loan situation was far worse than the banks had announced even a short time
earlier.
Three facts are important. First, most loans – good, doubtful, and bad – have
some form of collateral backing them, frequently real estate. The key issue is the
disposal value of the collateral. The actual losses banks have taken and will take
are substantially less than the estimates of bank bad loans bandied about. Second,
it has been very difficult for tax and legal reasons for a bank to actually write off a
loan as bad. Most of the ‘write-offs’ are in the form of provisioning – increased
allocations of profits and capital to bank loan loss reserves. Third, while small until
1995, over time the cumulative amount of actual write-offs has been huge and
impressive. The 21 Big Banks between 1992 and 1998 wrote off ¥42.02 trillion,
most (68.5 percent) in the last three years and ¥12.14 trillion (28.9 percent) in the
last year alone.5 This was financed from operations profits, realized capital gains
on securities holdings, and modest capital account transfers. The immensity of this
write-off is apparent in comparison with the amount of capital these banks had at
their peak (March 1994) of ¥22.15 trillion.
Bad loans and their write-offs are directly related to a bank’s capital. Banks
engaging in international operations, with overseas subsidiaries and branches, have
been subject to the Bank of International Settlements (B.I.S.) 8 percent capital
adequacy requirement, a serious constraint during much of the l990’s. As capital
was used to write off bad loans, banks had to raise more capital (difficult and
expensive); reduce total assets; or shift their asset portfolio risk mix away from
loans to government bonds. Banks doing only domestic business – credit
associations and cooperatives, second-tier regional banks, and some of the first-tier
regional banks – are subject to only a 4 percent capital requirement. In reality, both
the 8 percent and 4 percent requirements are unusually low in international
comparison; bank capital adequacy remains an issue for the future.
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Failure to Create Prudential Regulatory System
The first cause of the banking crisis was the fact that deregulation took place
without the creation of an effective system of prudential regulation and supervision
to replace the ‘postwar’ system of regulated interest rates, convoys, and
constrained competition which provided safety to the system. Deregulation
generates competition. Banks lost their guaranteed profits, market niches, and the
franchise value of deposit-collecting branches. Banks had to adjust to the
challenges as well as opportunities of an increasingly risky environment, yet their
capital bases were small. This created a situation of moral hazard, in which banks
took on greater risk in the expectation that if they suffered losses the Ministry of
Finance would bail them out. This was particularly true of the Big Banks, assumed
to be too large to be allowed to fail.
Since the deregulatory process was gradual, it took a long time for the
Ministry of Finance to realize it simply could not, and more importantly, should
not guarantee all banks against failure.6 In the mid-1990’s the Ministry of Finance
realized that even depositors might no longer feel completely safe. While deposits
were insured up to ¥10 million by the Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC), the
insurance fees charged banks were very low and the DIC reserves minuscule. They
could be, and in fact were, soon depleted by several small banking institution
failures.
To guarantee basic system safety the Ministry of Finance and government
have taken three actions. First, in summer 1995 the Ministry of Finance announced
that all deposits would be guaranteed until March 31, 2001. However, no specific
funds were earmarked to support this pledge. The Ministry of Finance (MoF)
believed its announcement effects were sufficient to ensure credibility. Second,
deposit insurance fees were sharply increased, up to U.S. levels. This generated
new DIC income and reserves, but the amounts were sufficient only to handle two
or three small bank failures annually, not more. Third, in February 1998 the
government enacted its ¥30 trillion bank bail-out package, of which ¥17 trillion is
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to cover the guarantee on deposits in excess of ¥10 million until 2001. Thus, a
credible safety net for depositors was finally established.
However, MoF has been much slower in imposing disclosure, capital
strengthening, and other prudential regulations. Its supervisory capabilities
appeared so weak they were hiv d off in June 1998 to the newly established
Financial Supervisory Agency directly under the Cabinet Secretariat. The
reluctance of MoF to move more rapidly in the 1990’s to impose a system of
prudential regulation was probably because it did not understand fully the
implications of deregulation. After all, deregulation undermined the old convoy
system, and made traditional M F modes of action now seem counterproductive.
MoF persisted nonetheless in attempting to defend an inefficient, uncompetitive,
and outmoded system.
Bursting Bubbles and Macroeconomic Police Mistakes
The second, and indeed most obvious, cause of the banking mess was first the
creation in the late 1980’s and then the bursting of the stock market and real estate
bubbles in the early 1990’s. The basic causes of the bubbles included macro mis-
management; widespread belief that, based on the entire postwar experience, land
prices would never decline for any sustained period so real estate was excellent
collateral; bank and related non-bank financial intermediaries, with ample, even
excess, funds rushing into the financing of urban land and real estate projects; and,
finally, this process creating a high degree of speculative excess in both real estate
and stock markets. Much of this story is familiar, and does not need to be repeated
here.7
However, macroeconomic policy mismanagement deserves special attention,
since Japan’s poor economic performance during the 1990’s has made the bank
bad loan problem worse over time, and has made it more difficult to resolve the
ongoing banking and financial mess. Between 1988 and 1998 the Japanese
government (ie. the Ministry of Finance) made five major macroeconomic policy
mistakes. While both fiscal and monetary policy instruments were involved, the
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Bank of Japan was subservient to, rather than autonomous from, the Ministry of
Finance.
There were two dimensions to these policy mistakes. One was the size,
timing, and degree of commitment when the authorities undertook demand
stimulus or restraint. The other was the growing imbalance between the use of
fiscal policy and monetary policy. Because the MoF’s fiscal policy ever since 1980
was single-minded pursuit of budget deficit reduction and budget surplus creation,
the responsibility for compensatory macro policy fell heavily and excessively on the
use of monetary policy instruments.
In 1986 when, following the sharp decline in the price of oil, the yen
appreciated more than expected and economic growth slowed more than desired,
the sole policy response was monetary stimulus. Interest rates were reduced to
postwar lows and money supply was expanded, while the MoF p rsisted in its
efforts to reduce the budget deficits of the 1970’s. That policy succeeded in
accelerating economic growth. The problem is that the policy was continued for
too long, at the least fueling and some would argue creating the stock and real
estate bubbles of 1988-90. That was the first macroeconomic mistake. In 1989, the
Bank of Japan finally began to raise interest rates sharply in a series of steps,
puncturing the bubbles, and leading to eventual economic growth slowdown, and
then stagnation.
The second mistake was in not easing monetary policy and fiscal policy
sooner and more forcefully in the early 1990’s, in 1992–3. The authorities saw the
downturn as primarily a business cycle. They underestimated both the cumulative
effect of structural problems, and the lasting and profound effects of the huge
ongoing decline in asset values. The prevailing perception was that, as in the past,
the downturn would be relatively short-lived and economic recovery and growth
would occur readily.
The third mistake was to rely excessively on easy monetary policy in the
mid-l990’s, so that interest rates since 1995 have been at incredibly and
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undesirably low levels. This extreme imbalance between fiscal and monetary policy
has virtually shackled the latter, making it very difficult to stimulate demand. While
the extraordinarily low interest rates have helped banks and borrowers, in effect
they simply postponed the resolution of the bad loan and corporate bankruptcy
problems, but at high economic and political costs. The low interest rate policy has
generated an excessively weak yen. Savers have been deeply dissatisfied, and are
increasingly seeking higher yields in foreign assets. Returns on pension funds have
been seriously inadequate, so that virtually all pension programs are substantially
underfunded. And, once interest rates do rise to a more normal level, the prices of
government bonds and similar financial assets will drop, imposing huge capital
losses on holders. (Government bonds are probably Japan’s most risky financial
asset in the intermediate term.)
The fourth macro policy mistake has been in the way fiscal stimulus through
supplementary budgets in the mid-1990’s was applied: too little, too late, and most
important, too grudgingly.8 Policy stimulus is supposed to inspire confidence in
businessmen and consumers. However, each policy package, especially the tax cut
component, was presented as mporary, and incorporated offsetting policies
which made ambiguous the stimulative signal that was supposedly being sent.
Moreover, the credibility of each fiscal stimulus package was undermined both by
the exaggerated statements concerning the real amount of stimulus – the real
water, to use the Japanese phrase – and by the focus on public works construction
that has become increasingly unproductive – roads, railroads, bridges to nowhere.
It was not until the supplementary budget in fall 1995 that fiscal stimulus finally
became effective, generating a good recovery, with 3.4 percent GDP growth, in
fiscal 1996.
The fifth macroeconomic policy mistake was the government decision in late
1996, beguiled by excessively optimistic economic forecasts for 1997 and beyond,
to shift its top policy priority 180 degrees from sustaining economy recovery to
tackling the long-run, structural problem of budget deficit reduction. While the
concern was appropriate, the timing was far too early. The policy error had two
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major components. The first was to shift the 1997 budget to severe fiscal restraint
from 1996 budget ease, reducing demand generation by as much as 2 percentage
points of GDP. This was done by increasing the consumption tax from 3 to 5
percent, ending the ¥2 trillion temporary personal income tax cut, and raising
medical care and other user fees. The second error was to enact a fiscal structure
reform law which stipulated steady annual decreases in future government budget
deficits and in the issuance of deficit financing government bonds.
Rather than continuing the recovery, in 1997 Japan’s economy stalled and
then went into decline. GDP shrank by 0.7 percent, and by year end the economy
was in recession (defined as two consecutive quarters of negative growth). The
fiscal structure reform law shackled Prime Minister Hashimoto’s government
politically; if he were to admit it was a mistake his own position was at risk.
Accordingly, even as economic conditions were obviously worsening at the
beginning of 1998, his government had first to pass a restrictive 1998 budget in
order to comply with the law before it could – at long last – announce in April
1998 the huge supplementary budget of ¥16.6 trillion (about ¥12 trillion in real
demand-generating expenditures and tax cuts), and to pass it in June 1998 in an
extended Diet session.
The Japanese economy has been the victim of these macroeconomic policy
errors throughout the 1990’s. On the one hand the MoF (Banking Bureau)
depended upon the restoration of economic growth to halt and reverse the
continuing declines in urban real estate prices, to convert marginal bank loans into
good rather than bad, and otherwise to ease the handling of the persistent,
immense bad loan problem. On the other hand the MoF (Budget and Tax Bureau)
persistently pursued budget deficit reducing measures which thwarted economic
recovery.
Effects of Globalization
The third cause of the ongoing banking mess is what is vaguely denoted by the
word ‘globalization’. This refers to changes both in the world political and
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economic environment and in Japan’s now major position in the world economy.
From the perspective of Japan’s financial system several elements are particularly
important.
First, since Japan is now a large country – in the terminology of economists
– its economic and financial policies are subject to reactive foreign pressures from
the United States, the European Community, the G-7, and others. Second, Japan
has become the world’s largest creditor nation as its persistent current account
surpluses has had to be invested abroad. Japanese banks, insurance companies, and
other financial nstitutions actively engaged in foreign lending and portfolio
investment, thereby exposing themselves to major foreign exchange risks. As the
yen appreciated, the cumulative losses were huge, almost on the same order of
magnitude as the financial system’s domestic bad loan losses. Third, the flourishing
of a free global capital market — the Euro-market — provided Japanese large
creditworthy companies with inexpensive bond and equity alternatives to loans
from Japanese banks. The MoF could not stop that offshore financing process.
Fourth, continuing deregulation, particularly the Big Bang, has made it attractive
for foreign banks, investment banks, securities companies, mutual funds, insurance
companies and asset management companies to compete in the Japanese home
market, on Japan’s hitherto restricted, sacrosanct turf.
Financial Technology Innovation
The fourth cause of the current financial mess is the high rate of innovation
in finance. This now includes a wide range of sophisticated high tech derivatives,
complex trading technologies, and changes in scale and organization for the
efficient management of financial services. This wave of innovation has been
accomplished mainly by American banks, investment banks and other financial
institutions, with some significant European players as well. While highly
sophisticated financial products are primarily for very large financial and industrial
corporations, new technologies are important in retail financial services markets as
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well, such as ATMs and the development and marketing of investment trusts
(mutual funds).
Japanese banks have been organizationally and institutionally unable to learn,
absorb and implement many of these new technologies sufficiently rapidly to be
able to compete in such markets with foreign institutions. These technologies
require specialists, not generalists, so the traditional Japanese management system
of job rotation and seniority-based wages undermine the development and
retention of specialists. The productivity and profitability of transactions – based
wholesale financial markets are directly and quickly measurable, and excellent
specialists are paid extraordinarily well. The most capable Japanese are frequently
hired away by foreign firms applying their systems of performance-based huge
bonuses but without job security.
A few major financial institutions have adjusted to these market realities, at
least in foreign operations, but not most. For example, Nomura Securities
Company’s New York operations were highly profitable in 1996, and its London
operations in 1997. Both were run by non-Japanese, and the top bonuses of the
highest performing specialists were more than $20 million.
Concluding Comments
The discussion in the previous section suggests basic reasons why Japan’s severe
banking problems have persisted so long. Here I recapitulate.
First was the mistaken belief in the early-mid 1990’s that the economy would
rebound quickly from what was perceived to be little more than a cyclical
downturn, and again the mistaken belief in late 1996 that recovery was so firmly
entrenched that the fiscal priority could immediately return to budget deficit
reduction. If the economy and especially real estate prices had indeed turned up,
then adjustment would have been easier and perhaps less costly, so a policy of
waiting it out was attractive, but turned out to be mistaken. Not surprisingly this
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led to a series of macroeconomic policy mistakes: too little stimulus, too great a
reliance on monetary relative to fiscal stimulus.
Second, as a consequence, MoF initially decided and the banks readily
agreed to simply wait out the bad loan problems until economic growth was
restored. It was not until 1995 that banks seriously started disclosing and writing
off bad loans. And it was not until recently that they reduced dividend rates, halted
annual increases in wages and bonus, or began to reduce the number of employees
significantly despite earlier attrition opportunities. In a remarkable statement in
1995, Nikkeiren (The Federation of Employers Associations) acidly noted that
bank manager salaries were 24 percent higher than those in comparable positions
in industry, and urged that banks reduce the disparity before taxpayers monies
(government funds) be used to bail them out of their difficulties. The widespread
sense among the public that banks were not making any significant sacrifices has
made it difficult for the political leadership to commit government funds to handle
what came to be an increasingly obvious need to bail out the banks if the system
were not to fall into chaos.
Third, the economy continued to grow only very slowly, averaging about 1
percent annually since 1991; more ordinary loans became doubtful, and more
doubtful loans became bad. Businesses could not generate cash flows for interest
payments much less loan repayments. Moreover, urban commercial real estate
prices continued to decline, are now some 70 percent or so below their peak, and
may only in mid 1998 be reaching the bottom. Office space, very tight in 1990,
became super abundant by 1995, as projects were completed. Rents declined
precipitously, exacerbated by the custom that most leases are for a maximum of
only two years. Many speculative projects, such as golf courses, have been only
partially constructed and may never be completed. Nonetheless, banks and other
holders of real estate, directly or as collateral, have refrained from selling,
apparently in hopes the market would bottom out soon as well as the fear that if
they sell real estate prices will fall even further.
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This series of mis-estimations of Japanese economic performance, which
delayed and thereby worsened Japan’s financial crisis, have created the current
crisis in Japanese financial institutions and markets. Only since early 1998 has the
government begun to seriously address these needs for financial reform and begun
to provide the public funding that is essential.
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Endnotes
1. Standard references on the postwar period include Suzuki (1985 and 1987),
Feldman (1986), Cargill and Royama (1988), Rosenbluth (1989), FAIR (1991), and
Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito (1997).
2. There were 11 city banks, three long-term credit banks, and seven trust banks, a
total of 21 Big Banks. With the merger of Bank of Tokyo and Mitsubishi Bank and
the failure of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank the city banks were reduced to nine. The
de facto absorption of Nippon Trust Bank by Mitsubishi Bank means that the Big
Banks as of summer 1998 are counted as 18 or 19.
3. For a description and analysis of the main bank system, particularly in the high
growth era, see Aoki and Patrick (1994).
4. The literature estimates of the evolving amounts of bad loans is substantial; see, for
example, Ohara (1996), Marsh and Paul (1996), and Waterhouse (1997-98).
5. See Waterhouse (1998a).
6. Stephen Vogel (1996) has well analyzed the slow, near-haphazard process of MoF
policymaking.
7. See Cargill, Hutchison and Ito (1997) Hartcher (1997), and Wood (1992 )
8. See the careful, thorough, econometric analysis of McKibbin (1996).
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